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Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the uniqueness of the dimension of memory in hypochondria. 
Its characteristic body distress is one of the most archaic modes of death experience, projecting itself into 
the concrete and into the immediate of the body. In hypochondria, the persecutory character that affects 
the subject’s body implies an “updating” in the sense of a devilish return of the same, a primary traumatic 
experience. The imminent danger of death, presented by the serious illness these subjects are convinced 
to have been affected by, expresses the continuing perception they have of body states. This comes from 
how long the time made present, an archaic time, stayed in the psychic life, closer to the level of perception. 
Thus, the ego updates its most basic and primordial mode of existing, paradoxically protecting itself from 
the effects of trauma.
Keywords: hypochondria, body, memory.
In hypochondria, the persecutory character acting 
on the subject’s body seems to us a kind of actualization, 
a demonic return, the primordial experience, which gives a 
new perspective on hypochondriac manifestations in which 
body anguish is one of the most archaic ways of living the 
experience of death. In hypochondria, it is projected onto 
the body surface.
Our purpose in this paper is to show that the bodily 
sensations caused by hypochondria perpetuate an archaic 
time whose history has been suspended. If time is frozen, 
suspended, nothing can succeed, there is a refusal of move-
ment. Body overinvestment, in our opinion, is an attempt to 
freeze time. Therefore, the ego updates its most elemental 
and primitive mode of existence, protecting itself thus from 
the effects of traumatic experience.
Which is the memory singularity, however, in these 
cases, i.e., in which way experienced events may be stored 
on the mind and always re-experienced on the body without 
being connected to a past experience as a memory?
Trauma and body memory
In the “Letter 52” (1950/1996e) Freud informed 
Fliess that he was working in a thesis that memory does not 
present itself at once, unfolding at different times, for being 
made of rearrangements, retranscriptions. He proposed a 
scheme made of different registers, which would be sepa-
rate according to the neurons, their vehicles. In this scheme, 
there is a first stage, perception, which does not preserve 
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any trace of the lived experience. After this stage, we have 
the first record, and this belongs to memory: indexes of 
perception. The second record corresponds to the inscrip-
tion of mnemonic traits of the unconscious, the memories. 
In the following record occurs the third transcription, pre-
consciousness, related to verbal representations, corre-
sponding to the ego.
Perception, the excitement in the perceptual sys-
tem leaves marks: the first signs of perception. They are 
the first transcriptions and in this process the original 
is lost, little of perception and of the original event is 
kept. What is preserved as an impression is what will be 
transposed. The signs of perception are the first record 
of the excitatory process of perception, therefore being 
a part of the memory system. However, to become mne-
monic traits, integrating the unconscious and therefore 
liable to memory, it will require another transcription 
(Lejarraga, 1996).
From the considerations from “Letter 52”, 
Knobloch (1998) draws a distinction between trait and 
mark regarding inscription. Mnemonic traits are uncon-
scious and may become conscious by assuming an in-
scription that may be rewritten and transcribed. Its entry 
in the psychic record is through established links with 
other traces of impressions, allowing its inscription in the 
memory. Otherwise, the mark (signs/indexes of percep-
tion) supposes a non-inscription. They are “sensations 
without words”, experiences that do not enter into the 
psychic representation circuit.
The author distinguishes, therefore, two types of 
memory:
A memorable form, which, as we already showed, 
is responsible for the construction of memory, 
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where the impressions would leave their traces and 
by their condition would be inscribed as represen-
tations within the psychic apparatus and, in their 
arrangement, are in constant transfer, modified by 
fantasy and interpretation. There is another form, 
which some call immemorial, immutable, and not 
connected. (Knobloch, 1998, p. 91)
Based on Fédida (quoted by Knobloch, 1998), 
who opposes a narrative memory to the infant memo-
ry, the author shows that the infant memory would be 
made of impressions that would remain unrepresented. 
Infant here does not mean childhood, but to not able 
to be released marks, “specific modes of real inf lu-
ence exerted upon pulsional life, during the whole ex-
istence and, in this sense, always present” (Knobloch, 
1998, p. 92). 
The idea of the infant memory is present in the 
Ferenczi’s (1930/2011) formulations, which in “Principle 
of relaxation and neocatharsis”, assumes the existence of 
“body mnemonic symbols” related to stages of develop-
ment in which “not being the organ of thought completely 
developed, only the physical memories were recorded” (p. 
74). The “body mnemonic symbols” are “physical memo-
ries”, as if the body were the place of thought. What acts 
here and os faced is the pain resulting from a not represent-
able excess (Knobloch, 1998).
According to Knobloch (1998), Ferenczi thinks the 
trauma from the verification that the patient “would op-
erate the pain” due to the impossibility of representation. 
What comes up in the clinic in these situations points to a 
different class, outside the field of representation, and that 
usually show up because of its allusion to not representable 
elements. This is an actualization of excess, of the trau-
matic experience. We must emphasize, however, that the 
absence of representative content does not mean absence of 
sensations and emotions. For Ferenczi (1931/2011), infans 
reactions to displeasure are always, and firstly, bodily in 
nature. There are no conscious memories of the course of 
events, but just sensations of pleasure or displeasure and 
also bodily reactions. “The ‘memory’ remains immobilized 
in the body and only there it can be awakened” (Ferenczi, 
1932/2011, p. 304, author’s emphasis).
Ferenczi proposed another way of “conservating 
experiences”, distinct from the inscription. For Knobloch 
(1998), this idea would have been developed from what 
Freud had made known with the notion of impression to 
point out that which is not yet an inscription. The trau-
matic mark, as inappropriate element in the subject’s his-
tory, tends toward actualization. Therefore, a dimension of 
psychic functioning outside the field of representation and 
temporality that characterized it are designed. It is a body 
memory in which the sensations related to an experience 
do not function as a memory.
On this matter, Reis (2004) considers that 
the body memory implies some kind of actualiza-
tion of scattered marks and sensations of self-erotic 
experiences—actualization regarding a pre-individual di-
mension in which the self still does not provide narcissist 
support for pulsional dynamics. Bodily changes under a au-
toplastic mode of autoerotic bias are repetitions of the trau-
matic marks that were kept registered as perception signs.
Fontes (2002) adds that somatization would be a 
pre-verbal operation, the result of a regression to a peri-
od—from the origins of the infant—in which these pre-lin-
guistic communications were part of the baby’s relationship 
with his or her environment.
There are cases that impression mnemonic traits do 
not subsist, even in the unconscious, so that the ori-
gins of the commotion stay inaccessible to memory. 
At this point, it is necessary to return to the body, 
to that we may call the patient’s “body memory”, 
to try to reconstruct a story that could not be recol-
lected. (Fontes, 2002, p. 63)
This memory immobilized in the body can only be 
accessed through the body. Body memory has close rela-
tionship with the traumatic event, the field of what can-
not be represented, and may only be awakened/accessed 
through sensations, somatic manifestations, an aspect that 
we deem essential to hypochondria. These sensations ac-
tualize an anguish of death, in which predominates the 
temporality of despair, as we will see in the following 
paragraphs.
Anguish of death, time of despair
In hypochondria there is no waiting time, but a 
temporality of urgency, of the present, despair, auto-
matic anguish. The hypochondriac is taken by anguishes 
of death because of his/her constant distrust on his/her 
own body, convinced that some deadly harm is settled. 
The hypochondriac anguish concerning the sick body, 
in an alleged imminence of death, configures a situation 
of despair.
It the words of Roussillon (1999), a “anguish-over-
flow” that establishes a state of disorder in progress, an 
undelayed and arbitrary threat. On the other hand, with the 
anguish-alarm signal, the self allows one to have time to 
process what would generate internally the disorganizing 
state, avoiding thus the risk of overflow.
It is worth mentioning that in Inhibitions, Symptoms 
and Anxiety (1926/1996c) Freud reshapes his anguish the-
ory. He considers the ego as the seat of anguish and, as 
a consequence, repression would be produced by anguish 
and not by the other way around, as he had stated until 
that point. He insists on a double origin of anxiety: as a 
direct consequence of the traumatic moment; and as a sign 
that threatens with a repetition of that moment (Freud, 
1933/1996d).
Roussillon (1999) explains that, faced with anguish, 
the main task of the self is to organize it as a preventive 
sign. The signal of anguish has precisely the function 
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of preventing/anticipating to the self a threat of disorder 
and operates in the ego in order to transform the previous 
traumatic experience in a cautionary signal. The signal of 
anguish presupposes the internalization of the traumatic 
experience, removing from the self’s interior borders the 
overflow threat. It gives the self enough time for a spe-
cific “adapted” action, time to choose and to be opened to 
conflict.
The transformation of anguish-overflow in the 
signal of anguish does not come from a simple process 
of return through which an interiorization would operate, 
but significantly reduces the intensity in which the signal 
must be only of displeasure and not of threat to the mind’s 
organization. This intensity reduction presupposes that an 
operation has been carried out by the self, an operation of 
igniting pulsional energy.
Given the effraction effects of the para-excitation 
system, Freud (1920/1996b) shows that the self mobilizes 
counter-charges to stop disorder, energy counter-invest-
ment able to restrain effraction. This counter-invest-
ment, however, may not be enough to establish a real 
alarm signal. The signal of anguish admits connection, 
establishment of traces that act as an auto-informative 
system for the self, so that it may anticipate and under-
take defense against the possibility of the irruption of 
pulsional excess.
On this topic, it is worth addressing the Winnicott’s 
contributions, particularly his concept of agony, in his 
writings on anguish without alarm signal. Agony indicates 
precisely the failure of representative organization. For 
Winnicott (1975), such failure would be the result of the 
self immaturity in the moment of the cataclysmic experi-
ence. It would be the case of archaic experiences that affect 
the subject’s rising self in a stage that the psychic organiza-
tion was not able to deal with the experience, not even to 
stick to it. For Roussillon (1999), that would prevent later 
establishment of the alarm signal.
The primitive agony has the following character-
istics: it is extreme, endless (temporal organizers are not 
yet developed), has no limits (it is a consequence of disor-
der), and has no way out. The ego would have to abstain 
itself from the experience to survive psychic death. Instead 
of dominating the trauma, the ego abstain itself from the 
traumatic experience through cleavage. This withdrawal, 
according to a protection disinvestment model, is an at-
tempt to build a defense. It is at stake a passive-active axis 
inversion, peculiar to a withdrawal from the experience 
(Roussillon, 1999).
Winnicott (1975) underlines the necessity of the 
self to place the agonistic experience in the present, to ac-
tualize it. From this idea, Roussillon (1999) adds that the 
defense against the agony return through passive-active 
axis inversion, creates an ever recurring state of agony, 
but restraining, at the same time, the subjective access to 
this experience. This defense implies deleting the historic-
ity and causality of trauma, making it difficult to ring the 
alarm signal.
The belief that undermines the subject’s future is 
related to a past event not symbolized in the moment expe-
rienced, nor truly symbolized later (a posteriori), because 
the subject is no longer present to experience it. The pre-
sentification/actualization of the “lost trauma” must be, 
therefore, understood as an appeal to the other, so as to help 
him or her to find a way out: to put it behind, historicize the 
trauma that would otherwise stay in the present.
In agony and automatic anguish, we have a time 
without waiting, a time of despair. Anguish-alarm signal 
is out of the question here, for it was not possible for the 
ego to emit the signal of anguish—it does not have an auto-
informative system of signs that would forewarn him about 
the pulsional outburst. Waiting time for completing the 
connection has not proven itself possible.
For Roussillon (2002), despair happens because 
the present experience has not been represented as a re-
edition of the forgotten past. It stays present, lived “out 
of time”; it refers to archaic temporality, which does not 
acknowledge the limit, the relative, time: happens in the 
eternally recurring present. When reactivated, presents 
itself again with the same features, with the same abso-
lute character, always present, endless, hopeless, without 
time. This is not a kind of timelessness proper to the un-
conscious, but an archaic experience prior to the subject’s 
organization of time. Thus, occurs the historical encyst-
ment of the experience.
Time of despair is underlying the compulsion to the 
repetition logic, an affirmative statement that there is noth-
ing to wait (André, 2002). For Golse (2002), despair is an 
active reaction, an active struggle, a stage of appeal, but 
paradoxically placed on the life’s side. It is a last struggle 
before psychic death. We understand despair as an active 
reaction for psychic survival. According to André (quoted 
by Golse, 2002, p. 35), “while there is despair, there is life”. 
Acknowledge despair as an active reaction, a fight for psy-
chic survival, even when ruled by the logic of automatism 
and actualization in the present, implies the reversal of pas-
sive axis to active.
In hypochondria, cleavage and projection in the 
body have an active character, as well as the automatism 
itself that actualizes the traumatic experience. The self 
gives up a part of itself to protect the rest. When the body, 
however, through projection, takes the place of the self, 
the sign, the agony is not extinguished, it only changes 
place, namely, from the inside to the outside. The body is 
constantly threatened by annihilation, diseases, contami-
nation, tumors, and so on. The cause of agony becomes 
exterior to the self, hindering the subject’s access to the 
experience and the possibility of historicize it.
The hypochondriac complaint is focused on the 
sensations and on the disease history from which the pa-
tient is away, because it would, according to subjective ex-
perience, happen against his will, making it impossible to 
live his life and follow the course of his own history.
These issues can be observed in the Charles 
case, Gibeault’s patient (2002), who felt anguish and 
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hypochondriac pains for six months. He complained of 
memory loss, vision disorders, intolerable belly pains. He 
was convinced he had cancer. He gave countless details 
about physical problems, about physicians consulted, and 
countless exams that he was submitted himself to discover 
the “truth” of his condition. He felt, however, that the doc-
tors did not want to tell him what they knew. In his unre-
strained search for doctors and specialists and, moreover, 
for clinical knowledge in books, Charles felt he was a doc-
tor (more than the doctors themselves), but always being 
misunderstood.
In psychotherapy he appealed to hypochondriac 
self-observation, complaining about body pains related to 
what he called “his dysentery”. He attributed the origin 
of his bellyaches to his father’s syphilis that would have 
contaminated him and he also believed he had acquired a 
parasitosis due to ingestion of “water contaminated by the 
Arabs” while he was in Tunisia. At one occasion, Charles 
arrives 15 minutes late and,
as usual, he complains about his bellyaches and 
says he could only came because he took a tranquil-
izer: “Always my parasitosis, my amebiasis, these 
things have names impossible to remember, it gives 
me a bloated belly; I don’t like Dr. X... he is not 
God”. (Gibeault, 2002, p. 123)
Faced with the impossibility of remembering, the 
body is summoned—Charles’ bloated stomach. With the 
evolution of the therapeutic process, however, the patient 
could evoke, among other things, the feeling of being an 
unwanted child. He remembers being a baby left crying 
in his cradle, comforted by his older brother, which in his 
opinion would attest his mother’s absence and inadequacy. 
Moreover, he could connect his current anguish to what he 
felt when he was a child, when he was separated from his 
mother to go to school. Or else, to the fear of being late and 
be punished, causing “fear in his stomach”.
Experiencing the anguish of death in the body, such 
as occurs in hypochondria, has as a paradigm the baby’s 
feeling of helplessness, who, given the lack of psychologi-
cal resources to deal with pulsations, experiences the an-
guish of annihilation in his own body. The hypochondriac 
body anguish is one of the most archaic ways of experienc-
ing death through the body. When the self is not yet com-
pletely developed as psychic instance and temporal marks 
are not established, all the experiences are printed in the 
body record, the field of body memory. But how does the 
body memory make itself present? 
Appeal to perception: last resource 
against overflow of pulsions 
In the case of hypochondria, perception is highly 
important. The feeling of an always sick body, constantly 
threatened by death make us wonder about the singularity 
of perception processes that, as we will show, are related 
to actualization and body memory. We agree with Press 
(1999) that the impossibility of inscription causes a dis-
placement onto perception.
Hypochondria evidences a super-investment of per-
ception, revealing a constant care with the body, even if 
it does not present organic damage that justifies this sur-
veillance of organs and bodily functions. Super-investment 
of the perception system is, in our view, a reaction to the 
lack of defensive investment capable of protecting the mind 
from pulsion overflow. When unrepresented elements are 
projected in the body, it produces a super-investment of 
perception so as the ego would not submerge by the return 
of these elements, a threat that in the case of hypochondria 
menaces the body. For this reason, the body is constantly 
monitored. Appealing to the body could be the ego last 
resource to be “in the presence” of these irrepresentable 
elements.
Super-investment of body perception in hypo-
chondriacs and the continuous state of alert they keep 
on smallest bodily modifications approximate our views 
to Forbes (2008) regarding the great capacity of obser-
vation in limit conditions and, on the other hand, the 
ineffectiveness of the transitivity of elements perceived 
and recorded.
The author explores the concept of “Verleugnung” 
used by Freud (especially in his works on fetishism and psy-
chosis) and is usually translated as “refusal”, but Figueiredo 
translates it as disallowing, because he considers it a term 
closest to the idea of “stopping a process by eliminating the 
transitive effectiveness from one of its links” (Figueiredo, 
2008, p. 59, author’s emphasis). What is refused is not a 
given perception, but what would come after—namely, the 
effectiveness of its transitive character. The refusal refers 
to a time and procedure dimension of the psyche, it is the 
psychic work that is blocked.
In “Neurosis and psychosis” (1924) Freud showed 
that it is always possible to obtain new perceptions from 
present perceptions, i.e., a present perception has the ca-
pacity to create other perceptions, to renew itself, to 
transit. In this case, new perceptions are refused: “what 
is disempowered is the capacity of a given perception to 
transit to other perceptions conserving certain continuity” 
(Figueiredo, 2008, p. 61, author’s emphasis). The percep-
tion is disempowered to provide or demand other steps in 
the psychic chain.
Under the impact of disallowing, the perception 
does not lose its meaning, but its significance; it was taken 
from a network of associations to be preserved as “almost-
something”. Certain elements cannot be integrated into the 
psychic flow because they lost their metaphorization ca-
pacity. That is, in the continuity of what we are developing 
it is as if the retranscription process of perception signs in 
psychic traits was blocked. This would be one of the rea-
sons hypochondriacs remain tied to body memory record.
To enlighten the disallowing concept, the above-
mentioned author emphasizes that a perception involves 
two moments of synthesis and there would be among them 
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a moment of undoing. The first is the synthesis, which 
generates forms, delimits, and gives shape to something, 
contradicting sensorial dispersion. If this closing cannot 
be undone, the perception process stops causing serious 
consequences.
The second moment of the process, opposite to the 
moment of synthesis, is the undoing, which allows to open 
enclosed images. It makes perceived images articulate with 
other images—in the timeline and in a continuous transi-
tive process. In the third moment operates the second syn-
thesis, continuing, giving transitivity and fluency to the 
perception process. It is in this process that each perception 
gains significance.
We believe that the problems of hypochondria, 
with insistent fixation on the conviction that a disease 
exists and denying anything that contradicts this belief, 
have roots precisely in the interrupted transition from 
the first synthesis for the undoing. The hypochondriac 
remains closed in the disease autocracy and the opening 
that could change his beliefs require interrupting the sec-
ond moment of perception (undoing) capable of changing 
his conviction.
According to Figueiredo (2008), the perception has 
authorization and effectiveness when it is capable of trig-
gering associative network tracks. In its turn, disallowing 
blocks perception processual and transitive character—its 
significance—without destroying, however, the first syn-
thesis (its meaning) and may have a greater power. To in-
terrupt the perception process would already imply in “not 
perceiving” something essential. Moreover, everything 
“not perceived” requires the creation of substitutes: the 
“pseudoperception”.
Contrary to perceptions that are inscribed in 
chains and circulate in the associative networks, 
a pseudoperception aims to interrupt the psychic 
progress, freezing itself in a very clear image, in-
transitive, and defensive. It can, therefore, for being 
so clear, have the appearance of a “superpercep-
tion”. (Figueiredo, 2008, p. 67, author’s emphasis)
With the disallowing of perception until the un-
conscious, these elements are retained within the senses, 
attached to the body memory. In the perception disallow-
ing, the impression subjected to this operation isolate itself 
from perception and its connections with mnemonic pro-
cesses and symbolization. We believe that the sick body 
complains and the super-investment of this pseudopercep-
tion restrain the transitivity of perception in its retranscrip-
tion/transformation into psychic traits in the unconscious.
Literal and “ultra-clear” character of 
hypochondriac sensations 
The bodily changes of which hypochondriacs com-
plain are a pseudoperception built from the disallowing of 
the perception process in a processual sense. The elements 
that could not be registered in the psyche as mnemonic 
traits were, however, retained in memory as perception 
signs. They remain, then, in a layer closer to perception 
records.
Laplanche (2007) believes that these elements not 
registered and, therefore, not translated would have re-
mained “in the surface of conscience”. They would have 
been kept in a thin layer of conscious defense, operating as 
a procedure. Hence the creation of the “medical theories” 
by hypochondriacs to deal with sensations that haunt them. 
It is a seemingly logical system of medical description of 
body conditions.
The complaint that indicates the paralysis of an 
endless nightmare lived in the waking state and that is 
not enough to express an affection in an intimate la-
ment translates to non subjective experience of the body 
(Fédida, 2009), and is in agreement with the lost ability 
to symbolically represent the body, leaving the subject 
trapped in a literal logic. Such literality may be perceived 
in these subjects speech when they talk about their so-
matic status; this is an “organ-speech”, as Freud warned 
us (1915/1996a).
The literality has an “ultra-clear” character and a 
relationship with the traumatic experience, with the im-
possibility of representation. According to Maldonado and 
Cardoso (2009), literality is the main feature of traumatic 
experience, making these elements introduce themselves 
as an unbearable “light”, hyper-real, without mediation, 
and, therefore, cannot be forgotten. The traumatic reveals a 
hole in the para-excitation system that will show itself “ul-
tra-clearly”, without the possibility of concealment. “When 
the ‘para-excitation’ system breaks, the protective web of 
fantasy also breaks, which would cover, enwrap the horror” 
(Maldonado & Cardoso, 2009, p. 54).
According to Borges (2012), the literal is due to the 
absence of representation that made it, as well as the fixed-
ness of its elements reveals a past that crystallizes itself as 
an absolute present. Literality is related to experiences that 
were not registered as representations, remaining in the 
psyche as marks, as perception signs. Because of its literal-
ity and clarity, these elements constitute a “hiper memory”, 
unlike the concealed memories. They have a tonality closer 
to affection and perception than to the representation and 
the symbolic.
Physical and psychic survival is urgent. The body 
survival is the guarantee of psychic existence, even if it 
is closely related to a bodily existence, as hypochondria 
shows us. The hypochondriac’s body is loud in its demand 
for constant care and attention.
In hypochondria, the reality—where attention and 
perception should always function as radars—is the reality 
of body modification/change. There is a super-investment 
of the exterior, since the body may assume the status of 
exteriority in relation to the self. Through projection on the 
body of unrepresented elements, the hypervigilance acts 
to ensure they stay in the outside-body, since they could 
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not be integrated in the ego and are, moreover, a threat of 
psychic disorder.
Reality tests: continuous actualization of 
surveillance
The need to keep distance from traumatic elements 
that threaten the ego with disorder puts the subject in an 
exacerbated hypervigilance, through a continuous percep-
tion of the body. This aspect leads us to investigate the in-
stallation of the reality sense in cases where the body is 
always fragile and constantly threatened with attacks by 
some kind of harm.
To accomplish the task we will approach the work 
by Figueiredo (2004) on reality tests in limit conditions. His 
hypothesis is that in such cases reality tests are repeated 
and do not dismay, and may be very frequent. The author 
starts, then, from what would be at stake in the proves of 
reality to which the psyche must submit itself in its healthy 
functioning.
Based on Freud and Ferenczi, he emphasizes the 
important distinction between “reality test” and “sense of 
reality”. To constitute a “sense of reality” (external and in-
ternal) the reality tests would no longer have the function 
of differentiating fantasy and perception. He uses, among 
other references, the works of two North-American psy-
choanalysts, Robbins and Sadow, who differentiate the re-
ality test, with the basic function of differentiating internal 
and external, of what they call “reality processing”. This is 
a more advanced stage of contact, knowledge, and adapta-
tion to reality. The hypothesis of Figueiredo (2004) is that 
“when reality processing cannot be made permanently (be-
cause it finds obstacles and is interrupted), reality testing 
gains are lost and they need to be made again continuously, 
always ineffective, unsatisfactory, and even disturbing” 
(pp. 509-510).
When the effective establishment of the sense of 
reality is compromised, the reality tests should be con-
tinuously carried out. In the long run, however, they usu-
ally fail because an effective sense of reality that could 
support the tests results has not been constituted, mak-
ing them tolerable and capable of being assimilated. 
Disallowing attacks the sense of reality, interrupting re-
ality processing.
According to the Freudian perspective, reality test-
ing comprises a temporality, because it is necessary a long 
period of suspension of the response so that fantasy and 
perceived reality could be confronted. Moreover, it is nec-
essary to renounce immediate pleasures, which only oc-
curs when there is hope of future reward. The suspension 
of discharge and the hope imply time, endure a waiting pe-
riod to obtain satisfaction later in the future.
When reality testing is required, but at the same 
time is ineffective, there is interruption of its transforma-
tion into continuous reality processing. In the absence of a 
sense of reality well established, the contact with reality, 
which would be fostered by reality tests, creates turbulence 
and oscillation, and its gains lead to suffering. Reality does 
not find interior space and time to be installed, becoming 
excessive, traumatic, incomprehensible, harassing, source 
of constant threat of annihilation.
We consider that in hypochondria there is no proper 
installation of the sense of reality, since the experience 
that could not be controled by the self is considered hos-
tile. Thus, reality tests are very important, but at the same 
time ineffective, for they need to be made again constantly, 
since they do not produce nor guarantee the proper estab-
lishment of reality processing and of the sense of reality. 
Reality tests are carried out frequently to discern the inside 
from the outside, keeping threatening elements outside, in 
a certain distance from the self. As for hypochondria, the 
exteriority is in the body.
The body is recalled in such cases as narcissistic 
self-preservation. Hypochondriacs “medical theories” on 
their body conditions are created as a try to understand, 
control what is not apprehended by the ego in face of the 
traumatic excess outbreak. The body becomes a research 
object, since it “hides” via projection unrepresented ele-
ments. Enlarged states of conscience and attention create 
a state of high perspicuity, allowing a radical knowledge 
of the body, source of threats to the self. It is a question 
of knowing, becoming familiar with this stranger who 
took possession of the body. In this survival strategy, 
“in which life defends itself from the body”, the super-
investment of the hypochondriac sick organ maintains an 
elementary narcissistic resource, in which the self is part 
of the body, fundamental condition for self-preservation.
Despite the constant reality testing for the traumatic 
elements remain in the body, even though the lack of effec-
tive installation of the sense of reality makes hypochondri-
acs constantly threatened by the return of traumatic events.
The same eternal actualization
Rethinking the logic of the “present”, we saw how 
hypochondria would be connected to automatic anguish, 
anguish of death, experienced in the body. In the absence 
of signal of anguish, which would prepare the self for agita-
tions, the time of despair is installed.
The “present” belongs to a specific temporality of 
the traumatic event, temporality of a never ending pres-
ent that does not become the past, and puts compulsively 
the actualization of unrepresented elements in the pres-
ent. Summoning the body and the sensations that ema-
nate from it perpetuate that period whose history has 
been suspended.
The hypochondriac formations put unrepresentable 
elements in the present. The hypochondriac logic produces 
desubjectification of symptoms, without symbolization and 
without connection with the subjective history and memory 
(Brusset, 2002). Given the lack of historicization, the pres-
ent sensation remains and also the history of the disease 
from which the patient is absent. The present would be a 
denial of a past always present and insurmountable.
4792016   I   volume 27   I   número 3   I   473-481
Body memory and hypochondria: an ever present archaic experience?
479
What is actualized in the sensations is the anguish 
of death in relation to the body. The imminent risk of 
death, introduced by the critical illness these patients 
believe they have been suffering, lead us to the relation-
ship between anguish and trauma. In hypochondria, the 
disease announces death, but the constant surveillance of 
the organ—the constant perception of body conditions 
and the reality tests—makes the patient stay in the pres-
ent, a survival time. Would it be a “triumph” over death?
The hypochondriac doubts his or her own health, 
suspecting that the body has been harmed. Combe (2010) 
points out that such attitude is part of our humanity, of 
knowing ourselves mortals, i.e., we are living within a 
vulnerable body. The hypochondriac doubt provides evi-
dence of the sensitivity to human vulnerability. In hypo-
chondria, something on the finitude appears as anguish 
caused by the body and this causes immobility. Being 
vulnerable confronts the self with mortality. And this the 
hypochondriac knows well: “attention: mortality on the 
horizon” (Combe, 2010, p. 63, our translation). Despite 
his mortal condition, the hypochondriac seeks for 
eternity; however, this becomes a punishment, as eternal 
actualization.
To suspend time, as underlines Bernateau (2010), 
is a way to avoid what is inevitable in death; narcissistic 
fantasy of eternity in which underlies a time suspended 
and dominated by death. To be out of time, freezing all 
temporality, one refuses the traumatic excitation. If the 
time is frozen, petrified, then nothing can come from it, 
nothing will unfold; there is a movement refusal.
Hypochondria is an attempt to freeze time 
through a super-investment of the organ, of the body. 
Thus, a feeling remains actualized rather than histori-
cized. Stay at an archaic time. What is more ancient in 
time is primitive, what is closer to perception. The tem-
porality of the present “carries the trait of infantia, of a 
‘period’ prior to time, when time was not yet psychically 
constituted” (André, 2008, p. 165, author’s emphasis). 
Hypochondria actualizes an archaic mode of operation, 
triggered on the outbreak of the traumatic event, from 
which, to survive the ego seems to actualize its basic and 
primeval mode of existence.
Memória corporal e hipocondria: um vivido arcaico sempre presente?
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a singularidade da dimensão de memória na hipocondria. A angústia corporal que 
lhe é característica constitui um dos modos mais arcaicos de vivência da experiência de morte, projetando-se na concretude e 
no imediato do corpo. Na hipocondria, o caráter persecutório que incide sobre o corpo do sujeito implica uma “atualização” no 
sentido de um retorno demoníaco do mesmo, de um vivido traumático primordial. O perigo iminente de morte, apresentado 
pela doença grave da qual esses sujeitos estão convencidos de terem sido acometidos, expressa a contínua percepção que 
eles têm dos estados do corpo. Isso resulta da permanência na vida psíquica de um tempo presentificado, tempo do arcaico, 
mais próximo do registro da percepção. Desse modo, o ego atualiza seu modo de existência mais elementar e primordial, 
protegendo-se, paradoxalmente, dos efeitos do traumático.
Palavras-chave: hipocondria, corpo, memória.
Mémoire corporelle et l’hypocondrie: un vécu archaïque toujours présent?
Résumé: L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser le caractère unique de la dimension de la mémoire dans l’hypocondrie. La 
détresse corporelle caractéristique est l’un des modes les plus archaïques du vécu de l’expérience de la mort, qui se reflète 
dans la matérialité et l’immédiateté du corps. Dans l’ hypocondrie, le caractère de persécution qui se concentre sur le corps du 
sujet implique une « mise à jour » dans le sens d’un retour démoniaque du même, un vécu traumatique primaire. Le danger 
imminent de mort, présenté par la maladie grave dont ces sujets sont convaincus qu’ils ont été touchés exprime la percepcion 
continué qu’ils ont de ses états de corps. Ceci résulte de la permanence dans la vie psychique d’un temps présentifié, temps 
de l’archaïque, plus proche du champs de la perception. Ainsi, le moi met à jour son mode d’existance le plus primordial et 
fondamental, tout en se protégeant, paradoxalement, des effets traumatisants.
Mots-clés: hypocondrie, corps, mémoire.
Memoria corporal e hipocondría: ¿Un arcaico vivido siempre presente?
Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo fue analizar la singularidad de la dimensión de la memoria en la hipocondría. La angustia 
corporal que es su característica es uno de los modos más arcaicos de la experiencia demuerte, que se proyecta en la concretud 
y en el inmediato del cuerpo. En la hipocondría, el carácter persecutorio que incide en el cuerpo del sujeto implica una 
“actualización”, en el sentido de un retorno demoníaco de lo mismo, un vivido traumático primario. El riesgo inminente de 
Psicologia USP   I   www.scielo.br/pusp480
Patrícia Paraboni & Marta Rezende Cardoso
480
muerte, presentado por la enfermedad grave que estos sujetos están convencidos de que les afectan, expresa la continua 
percepción que tienen de sus estados corporales. Esto resulta la permanencia en la vida psíquica de un tiempo presentificado, 
tiempo del arcaico, más cerca del registro de la percepción. Así, el ego actualiza su modo de vida más básico y primordial, 
mientras paradójicamente protege a sí mismo de los efectos del trauma.
Palabras clave: hipocondría, cuerpo, memoria.
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